This paper develops a theoretical model of asymmetric competition between a pay TV and a free TV broadcaster. Our model shows that the pay TV broadcaster has incentives to place advertising on its channel if the marginal return on advertising exceeds the viewers' disutility from advertising. In this case, however, the pay TV advertising level is always below the corresponding level on free TV. The pay TV advertising level can increase with a higher viewer disutility from advertising but the pay TV channel will never attract a larger viewership than the free TV channel. Furthermore, we show that introducing advertising on pay TV induces a decrease of the subscription fees on this channel and a decrease in the advertising level of the free TV channel. Moreover, pay TV viewer demand can increase if the pay TV broadcaster places advertising on its channel. If the viewer disutility of advertising is sufficiently large, aggregate broadcaster profits increase through the introduction of advertising in pay TV, while aggregate consumer surplus always increases.
Introduction
The television broadcasting industry is of crucial economic and social importance in the US. Nearly every household owns a television set and the average American adult spends more than five hours a day viewing television (TVB, 2011a) . Television is also a very important media for placing advertisements. In 2010, advertisers spent about $71 billion (total advertising expenditures were $131 billion) to promote their products and services on television (TVB, 2011b) . There are two generic business models in the television broadcasting industry: commercial free-to-air television and pay TV. Traditionally, the television broadcasting industry has been dominated by free TV. In this business model, viewers are fully subsidized because broadcasters want to attract as many viewers as possible in order to maximize advertising revenues. Basically, a TV channel is more attractive for advertisers, the larger its viewership. On the other hand, viewers typically dislike advertising as it is perceived as a nuisance. This trade off suggests that there is an optimal amount of advertising.
Due to technological progress (i.e. encryption techniques and digital decoding) pay TV has emerged as a competing business model. Originally, pay TV broadcasters did not air advertisements, but directly charged viewers for TV access. More recently, however, some pay TV channels (in the US mostly cable subscription television networks such as TNT, TBS, ESPN) started to air commercials in addition to charging subscription fees. What are the economic effects of placing advertising on pay TV channels? How will free TV broadcasters react? Will market shares of pay TV increase or decrease? Whose profits will increase and whose will decrease? And, most importantly, will consumers benefit or not?
To answer these and related questions, we develop a theoretical duopoly model of asymmetric competition between a pay TV and a free TV broadcaster by utilizing the Hotelling approach. We analyze the effects of placing pay TV advertising on broadcaster market strategies (i.e., choice of subscription fee and advertising level), viewer demands, broadcaster profits and consumer surplus. So far, the literature has concentrated on the symmetric competition between either pay TV or free TV broadcasters. Because the reality is often characterized by the coexistence of both pay TV and free TV, more research that analyzes the competition between both business models is needed. Research on symmetric competition neglects the important aspect of consumer migration from one business model to the other. This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature.
Our model shows that the pay TV broadcaster has incentives to place advertising on its channel if the marginal return from advertising exceeds the viewers' disutility from advertising. In this case, however, the pay TV advertising level is always below the corresponding level on free TV. Surprisingly, the pay TV advertising level can increase with a higher viewer disutility from advertising but the pay TV channel will never attract a larger viewership than the free TV channel. Furthermore, we show that introducing advertising in pay TV induces a decrease of the subscription fees on this channel and a decrease in the advertising level of the free TV channel. Moreover, pay TV viewer demand can increase if pay TV places advertising on its channel. Surprisingly, if the viewer disutility of advertising is sufficiently large, aggregate broadcaster profits increase through the introduction of advertising in pay TV, while on aggregate, consumers always benefit from advertising on pay TV.
With increasing popularity and coverage, one can observe that various revenues models are chosen by the pay TV broadcasters. Some pay TV channels choose to charge a higher subscription fee, but air little or no advertising, while other pay TV channels combine both viewer and advertiser incomes. This paper provides a conceptual framework for how to choose and implement an optimal pay TV strategy when a free TV competitor preexists in the market. It can also serve as a guide for pay TV broadcasters considering a possible pay TV strategy change. Furthermore, our paper derives implications for policy makers and regulatory authorities. For example, we find additional pay TV advertising is not necessarily socially undesirable due to the strategic market reactions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature. In Section 3, we introduce the analytical framework. Section 4 presents the equilibrium analysis of the model. In Section 5, we examine the effects of introducing pay TV advertising on relevant equilibrium outcomes. Section 6 concludes and provides implications for future research.
Related Literature
The literature on the economics of media markets is flourishing and has experienced a significant growth in recent years.
1 The focus of the extant literature is on the choice of optimal market strategies by media platforms (i.e., content differentiation, advertising level and viewer charge) and welfare implications in models with symmetric competition between either free TV or pay TV. Some papers also consider two separate scenarios, in which competition takes place between pay TV and free TV platforms, respectively, and they compare the two independent scenarios. The key distinction of our paper from previous research is that we explicitly model the direct competition between pay TV and free TV, rather than treating them independently. Thus, our paper offers insights about a scenario, in which pay TV and free TV exist at the same time and compete for the same viewership. Although in reality pay TV and free TV often coexist, the literature has neglected to model this aspect of asymmetric competition. For example, in a model of symmetric competition, Anderson and Coate (2005) ana-lyze the nature of market failure in the broadcasting industry. Commercial broadcasters provide advertising levels and programming amount that can be above or below socially optimal levels, depending on how strongly viewers dislike advertising. With the ability to price programming, broadcasters can internalize the nuisance of advertisements by substituting prices for advertising at the margin. However, this is not necessarily socially desirable because pricing may also result in some viewers being inefficiently excluded. In a similar context, Peitz and Valletti (2008) also introduce endogenous content provision by competing TV broadcasters into their model.
2 They assume that pay TV broadcasters generate revenues from both advertisers and viewers, whereas free TV broadcasters are solely funded by advertising. Their model shows that under free TV the advertising level is higher than under pay TV when viewers strongly dislike advertising. Under free TV, broadcasters tend to provide less differentiated content while they always maximally differentiate their content under pay TV. However, they do not model asymmetric competition because they consider two separate regimes with two competing pay TV channels and two competing free TV channels, respectively. Rather than horizontal program diversity, Armstrong (2005) studies the endogenous choice of vertical program quality by competing broadcasters in a model of symmetric competition. He also considers two separate funding regimes, in which either two pay TV channels or two free TV channels compete against each other and finds that the program quality level in the pay TV regime is higher than under the free TV regime. Our model builds on Armstrong (2005) , but we model asymmetric competition and focus on the effects of introducing advertising on pay TV.
Moreover, Armstrong (2006) analyzes the competition between media firms in the broader concept of a two-sided market.
3 Inter alia, he analyzes a competitive bottleneck in a two-sided media market, in which media platforms compete for viewers but not for advertisers.
4 If the consumers join only one specific media platform, advertisers have to place advertising on all competing platforms to reach all consumers. The model shows that the equilibrium price for the access to media platforms (i.e., magazines) depends on how advertising charges are levied. The equilibrium reader price and platforms' profit is lower (higher) if platforms charge advertisers on a lump-sum basis than under a per-reader basis in the case that readers like (dislike) advertising. All papers mentioned above have considered models of duopoly competition in Hotelling fashion. Crampes et al. (2009) Kind et al. (2009) allows the number of media platforms to vary and investigates how media platforms raise revenue in a model with quadratic consumer preferences. They find that media firms' scope for raising advertising revenues is constrained by the number of media firms. Moreover, a low level of horizontal differentiation between two media firms, or rather their content, restricts the scope for raising revenues from direct consumer payment. However, neither of these papers on media competition have analyzed the asymmetric competition between pay TV and free TV. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that analyzes asymmetric competition is Lin (2011) , who develops a duopoly model of asymmetric competition between pay TV and free TV. His model focuses on the endogenous choice of program quality made by television broadcasters. The paper shows that the broadcasters vertically differentiate their channel programs if viewers strongly or weakly dislike advertising. Depending on the degree of horizontal differentiation, pay TV offers higher or lower quality programming than free TV. However, contrary to our model, Lin (2011) excludes the possibility that pay TV can introduce advertising.
Analytical Framework
We consider a TV viewing market that is served by one pay TV broadcaster and one free TV broadcaster. TV viewers, who are of mass one, are uniformly distributed along the unit interval. The two competing channels are situated at the extremes of the interval with the pay TV channel located at x = 0 and the free TV channel located at x = 1. We consider the Hotelling model with linear transport cost of t > 0 per unit of length. Hence, the two channel programs are horizontally differentiated from the perspective of viewers and the parameter t can be interpreted as the differentiation parameter. A lower value of t means that the channels or their program are perceived as closer substitutes by the viewers.
The indirect utility of a viewer, located at point x ∈ [0, 1] when choosing the pay TV channel denoted by p and the free TV channel denoted by f , respectively, is defined as
where v > 0 represents the viewers' intrinsic value from watching TV. The pay TV broadcaster charges viewers a subscription fee s p > 0 for the access to the channel programming. 6 We assume that both channels can place advertising, where the amount of advertising placed on the pay TV and free TV channel is given by a p and a f , respectively. The parameter γ > 0 describes the extent to which viewers dislike advertising because each advertisement produces a perceived nuisance cost of γ by the viewers. 7 Moreover, we make the assumption of full viewer market coverage, i.e., the viewers' intrinsic value from watching TV is sufficiently large such that all viewers will watch one program. We further assume that viewers are single-homing, i.e., they choose only one channel to watch. The marginal viewer, who is indifferent between watching pay TV and free TV, can be identified at the location x = 1 2
. All viewers to the left of x, i.e., x ∈ [0, x), decide to watch pay TV programming and all viewers to the right of x, i.e., x ∈ (x, 1], consume free TV programming. As a result, the viewer demand functions for the pay TV and free TV channels, respectively, can be derived as
We exclude the possibility of demand tipping at the viewer market which implies that each broadcaster captures a positive market share. We assume that placing advertising on its channel produces costs for each broadcaster given by c(a) where c(a) ∈ C 2 is a strictly convex cost function with c (a) > 0 and c (a) > 0 for a > 0 and c (0) = c (0) = 0. 8 These costs can be interpreted either as transaction costs when broadcasters negotiate, serve, and deal with the advertisers, or as direct costs for the operative/technical realization of advertising implementation.
Alternatively, these costs can be interpreted as broadcasters' opportunity costs for givenup programming slots/time. For simplicity, we assume that there are no other costs. The profit functions of the broadcaster are then given by
where k > 0 is a parameter that captures how much revenue a broadcaster can generate per ad a. The parameter k can be interpreted as a measure for the effectiveness of advertising. For tractability, we assume a linear specification of advertising revenue, i.e., a broadcaster generates revenues of kan if its channel programming attracts n viewers and a advertising are placed on the channel. Moreover, the consumers (viewers) of the pay TV and free TV channel derive the following surpluses:
Aggregate consumer (viewer) surplus is then given by the sum of pay TV and free TV consumer surpluses, i.e., CS = CS p + CS f .
Analysis
The pay TV broadcaster has two strategic variables at its disposal: the subscription fee s p and the level of advertising a p . For the free TV broadcaster, the level of advertising a f is the only choice variable. Therefore, the broadcasters solve the following maximization problems:
The first-order conditions for the pay TV broadcaster are given by
where c (a) ≡ ∂c(a) ∂a
. To ensure that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied, the differentiation parameter t has to be sufficiently large, i.e.,
∂a 2 . From the first-order conditions (11) and (12), we observe that increasing either the subscription fee or the advertising level triggers a positive revenue effect and a negative demand effect because pay TV viewer demand decreases with s p and a p , respectively. Additionally, increasing the advertising level induces higher costs (cost effect).
For the free TV broadcaster, the first-order condition is given by
and has a similar interpretation as above. By solving this system of equations, we can establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (i) For the pay TV channel, the subscription fee s * p and advertising level a * p in equilibrium are implicitly given by
and for the free TV channel the equilibrium advertising level a * f is implicitly given by
(ii) The equilibrium (s * p , a * p , a * f ) exists and is unique if the differentiation parameter t is sufficiently large with t > t eq .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Regarding part (i), we assume that t > t s ≡ ka * p + γ(a * p − a * f ) to ensure the pay TV broadcaster sets a positive subscription fee. Hence, if the channel programs are not sufficiently differentiated, the viewers are not willing to pay an additional subscription fee for watching pay TV containing advertising because they can enjoy similar programs on free TV. As a result our model would collapse to one with symmetric competition between two free TV broadcasters. Moreover, to ensure the free TV sets a positive advertising level, the differentiation parameter t has to be sufficiently large, with t > t a f ≡ γa *
9 For a derivation of the second-order conditions, see the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A.1.
10 The second-order condition is satisfied because
According to part (ii), a necessary assumption to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is also a sufficiently large differentiation parameter with t > t eq . This assumption guarantees that the advertising level, which pay TV would have to set such that the free TV broadcaster has no incentives to place advertising on its channel (i.e., free TV is driven out of the market) is larger than the pay TV advertising level if free TV refrains from advertising. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, we need this technical property to show that the reaction functions have at least one intersection point, which ensures the existence of an equilibrium. The uniqueness then follows from the strictly monotonous reaction functions. In the case of a quadratic cost function c(a) = 1/2a 2 , the threshold is given by t eq =
Hence, a fulfillment of the secondorder condition for pay TV implies the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. However, this is not necessarily true for a general cost function c(a) because the threshold t eq , which is only given implicitely, depends on c (a). Therefore, in the subsequent analysis, we assume that the differentiation parameter is sufficiently large with t > t * ≡ max{t SOC , t eq , t s , t a f }.
With the subscription fee s * p , the equilibrium demands of the viewers for the pay TV and free TV channels, respectively, are given by
Note that t > t * also ensures that n * p and n * f are both positive. In a further step, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (i) For γ = k, the pay TV broadcaster will not place advertising on its channel, while for γ ∈ [0, k), the pay TV broadcaster places advertising on its channel and its level of advertising is always below the corresponding level on the free TV channel.
(ii) The level of advertising a * f on the free TV channel always decreases with a higher viewer disutility γ from advertising. For the pay TV channel, the level of advertising a * p increases with a higher viewer disutility if this disutility is sufficiently small. Formally,
.
(iii) The pay TV channel never attracts a larger viewership than the free TV channel independent of the viewer disutility from advertising, i.e., n * f ≥ n * p .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Part (i) of the proposition indicates that a pay TV broadcaster has incentives to place advertising on its channel in addition to a positive subscription fee, if the marginal return on advertising exceeds the viewers' disutility from advertising, i.e., k > γ. In other words, for a given level of k, placing advertising is beneficial for the pay TV broadcaster's profits whenever the viewers' disutility from advertising is not too strong. Otherwise, i.e., if γ = k, the pay TV broadcaster is better off in terms of profits when relying only on subscription fees.
11 It implies that there is no scope for pay TV to place advertising when the viewers' disutility from advertising is too strong (γ = k). Otherwise, viewers will simply migrate away from pay TV where they originally intend to avoid annoying advertising by paying a subscription fee. If the viewers' disutility from advertising is below the marginal return on advertising, then the pay TV broadcaster is able to choose an optimal income mix from both subscription and advertising revenues. However, in this case, the pay TV channel will always set a lower advertising level than the free TV channel.
Our result for the case γ < k also rejects the claim of so-called "profit neutrality." It has been often demonstrated that there is a full pass-through of advertising revenues into lower subscription fees.
12 It implies that advertising revenues do not affect the profits of two media platforms in equilibrium; however, this finding is only valid for the case of symmetric competition between two pay TV channels both using advertising. We have shown, under certain circumstances, profit neutrality does not apply to the pay TV broadcaster under asymmetric competition with a free TV channel because advertising revenues are not neutral, but rather increase overall profit. Regarding the comparative statics results in part (ii), we derive that the advertising level a * f of the free TV channel always decreases with a higher viewer disutility from advertising γ. To observe the intuition behind this result, we rearrange the first-order condition (13) of the free TV broadcaster and write
Recall that a higher free TV advertising level triggers a positive effect kn * f through higher advertising revenues and a negative effect ka * f ∂n * f ∂a f through a lower viewer demand on profits. We derive that a higher γ diminishes the positive effect and strengthens the negative effect, which lowers the right-hand side (rhs) of (18).
13 As a result, the free TV broadcaster lowers its advertising level a * f to ensure a decrease of the left-hand side (lhs). Regarding the behavior of the pay TV broadcaster with respect to a higher disutility parameter γ, we rearrange its first-order condition (12) and write c a *
11 The case γ > k is not feasible as shown in Appendix A.2. 12 See, for example, Peitz and Valletti (2008) . Similarly to above, a higher free TV advertising level triggers a positive effect kn * p through higher advertising revenues and a negative effect (s * p + ka * p ) ∂n * p ∂ap through a lower viewer demand on profits. Contrary to above, a higher viewer disutility from advertising strenghens both the positive and the negative effect. Hence, the effect of a higher γ on the rhs of (19) is ambiguous and depends on the level of γ. First, suppose that the threshold γ is positive, which implies that the differentiation parameter t is sufficiently small, i.e., t < t ≡ k(a * f − 2a * p ). If γ is sufficiently small with γ < γ, then the rhs increases with a higher viewer disutility from advertising such that the pay TV broadcaster increases a p to ensure an increase of the lhs. If γ > γ, the reverse is true and the advertising level in pay TV decreases with a higher γ. However, if the differentiation parameter t is sufficiently large, i.e., t > t, then the threshold γ is negative, and hence, a higher viewer disutility from advertising induces a decrease in the advertising level in pay TV independent of γ.
Part (iii) of the proposition indicates that the free TV channel never attracts a lower viewership than the pay TV channel even though viewers might derive a comparatively large disutility from advertising and the advertising level in free TV is always higher than in pay TV. To observe the intuition behind this result, consider the case where viewers do not perceive advertisement as a nuisance, i.e., γ = 0. In this case, it is not surprising that the free TV channel attracts more viewers than the pay TV channel because viewers are charged via the subscription fee for pay TV. Increasing the disutility parameter γ has the following effects on pay TV viewer demand. Total differentiation of
Given that the free TV channel has a higher level of advertising than the pay TV channel, a higher γ pronounces this difference and therefore has a direct positive effect a * f − a * p on viewer demand. However, it is ambiguous whether the difference in advertising levels a * f −a * p shrinks or expends such that the sign of the second effect is undetermined. Finally, a higher γ induces an increase in the subscription fee s * p , which has a negative effect on pay TV viewer demand. Overall, it is ambiguous whether pay TV viewer demand follows a U-shaped or an inverted U-shaped pattern in the disutility parameter γ. However, we know if the differentiation parameter t is sufficiently small, i.e., t < t, 14 then pay TV and free TV viewer demand follows an inverted U-shaped and U-shaped pattern in γ, respectively, because a higher viewer disutility from advertising induces a decrease in the pay TV advertising level. Formally, ∂n *
Finally, we derive that the pay TV channel attracts the same viewership as 14 Note that t < t implies γ > 0. the free TV channel if the disutility parameter γ is given by γ = (5) and (6), we derive the equilibrium profits of the pay TV and free TV broadcaster, respectively, as
The Effects of Placing Advertisements in Pay TV
In this section, we investigate the effects of marginally increasing the pay TV advertising level on the equilibrium outcomes. With this approach, we can deduce the consequences if a pay TV broadcaster switches from a strategy that solely relies on subscription fees to a strategy where, in addition to subscription fees, the pay TV broadcaster places advertising on its channel. 15 To ensure that the pay TV broadcaster has incentives to place advertising on its channel, we assume that γ < k. First, we analyze the effects of introducing pay TV advertising on the free TV advertising level, the pay TV subscription fee and viewer demands. We establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Introducing advertising on the pay TV channel has the following effects:
(i) The subscription fee on the pay TV channel decreases and the free TV channel reduces its advertising level.
(ii) Viewer demand for pay TV decreases and viewer demand for free TV increases if the viewers' disutility from advertising is sufficiently large with γ > γ n ≡
. The reverse holds true for γ < γ n .
Proof. Below in the text.
Part (i). The subscription fee on the pay TV channel decreases if the pay TV broadcaster decides to place advertising on its channel. To prove this finding, we compute the total derivative of s * p with respect to a p as
Both the direct effect, as well as, the indirect effect of a higher a p are negative, yielding a lower subscription fee. To compensate the viewers for watching advertising, the pay TV broadcaster lowers its subscription fee. In more common terms of the two-sided market 15 Formally, the effect of introducing advertising on pay TV is given by ∂ ∂ap ap=0
. literature, additional advertising revenues will be passed through to the viewers in the form of a lower subscription fee.
16
To prove the claim that the free TV channel always reduces its own advertising level when the pay TV channel places advertising, we rearrange the optimality condition (15) of the free TV channel and we derive
Intuitively, one might think that when a pay TV channel introduces advertising, the free TV channel faces less fierce competition and hence, tends to increase its own advertising level. However, as we have shown, there is also an accompanying effect from pay TV, lowering its subscription fee. The latter effect dominates, and hence, the free TV channel reduces its own advertising level.
Part (ii) shows that the demand effect of introducing advertising in pay TV depends on the level of viewers' disutility from advertising. If the disutility is sufficiently small (i.e., γ < γ n ) then viewer demand decreases for free TV and increases for pay TV. If the disutility is sufficiently large (i.e., γ > γ n ) then the opposite holds true. Formally, the effect of a higher pay TV advertising level on the pay TV viewer demand (16) is given by
On one hand, a higher advertising level a * p has a positive (direct) effect on the viewer demand n * p because the lower subscription fee overcompensates for a higher advertising level. On the other hand, the indirect effect via a lower advertising level a * f on the free TV channel is negative. The overall effect on n * p depends on the extent γ to which viewers dislike advertising, i.e.,
Hence, if the viewers' disutility of advertising is sufficiently small, i.e. γ < γ n , introducing advertising on the pay TV channel induces a higher demand on this channel but a lower demand on the free TV channel because n * f = 1 − n * p . If, however, the viewers' disutility of advertising is sufficiently large, i.e. γ > γ n , then introducing advertising on the pay TV channel induces a lower demand on this channel but a higher demand on the free TV channel. The intuition is as follows: when viewers strongly dislike advertising, they will value a reduction in the level of advertising on free TV more than a decrease in the subscription fee for pay TV. As a result, free TV becomes relatively more attractive for the viewers and more viewers will choose free TV over pay TV.
In the next proposition, we analyze the effects of placing pay TV advertising on broadcaster profits and consumer surplus.
Proposition 3 Introducing advertising on the pay TV channel has the following effects:
(i) Aggregate broadcaster profits increase if the viewers' disutility from advertising is sufficiently large with γ > γ Π .
(ii) Consumer surplus of pay TV viewers increases if the viewers' disutility from advertising is sufficiently large with γ > γ CSp , while the viewers' disutility from advertising must be sufficiently small with γ < γ CSf to ensure an increase in consumer surplus of free TV viewers. However, aggregate consumer (viewer) surplus always increases independent of the viewers' disutility from advertising.
Regarding the effects on pay TV broadcaster profits in part (i), we know that the profit-maximizing advertising level for the pay TV channel is positive, i.e., a * p > 0 if the viewers' disutility from advertising is smaller than the marginal return of advertising, i.e., γ < k. Hence, it is clear that profits of the pay TV channel must increase when switching from a strategy that solely relies on subscription fees to a strategy consisting of both subscription and advertising income, i.e., π * p (s * p , 0) < π * p (s * p , a * p ). Otherwise, the pay TV channel would opt not to place any advertising and choose a * p = 0. Hence, for γ < k, additional advertising revenues will overcompensate the loss in subscription revenues and additional costs. Formally, we derive
However, two questions remain whether and under which conditions the free TV broadcaster can benefit from the pay TV's strategy change. The effect of introducing pay TV advertising on the free TV broadcaster profit is given by
We know that the introduction of pay TV advertising leads to a reduction of the advertising level on the free TV channel. This reduction triggers a negative effect through lower advertising revenues and a positive effect through lower advertising costs. Moreover, the reduction of the advertising level on the free TV channel affects viewer demand.
The demand effect can be positive or negative dependent on the viewers' disutility fromis clearly positive. However, a higher pay TV advertising level triggers a negative effect
Conclusion
This paper develops a model of asymmetric competition between a pay TV broadcaster and a free TV broadcaster to analyze the effects of introducing advertising in pay TV. Our model shows that the pay TV broadcaster will place advertising on its channel if the viewers' disutility of watching advertising is not too strong. Introducing advertising on the pay TV channel leads to a lower subscription fee because additional advertising revenues will be passed through to the viewers. Moreover, as a strategic reaction, the free TV channel reduces its own advertising level. The corresponding viewer demand effects are ambiguous. If the viewers derive a sufficiently low disutility from advertising, then placing advertising in pay TV induces a higher demand on this channel but a lower demand on the free TV channel. In this case, the viewers value a decrease of the subscription fee in pay TV more than a reduction of the advertising level in free TV. Because the demand effects are neutral in our Hotelling model, the overall consumer surplus on both channels increases through the introduction of pay TV advertising. Consumers of pay TV benefit from the introduction of advertising on their channel if their disutility derived from watching advertising is sufficiently low, while the reverse holds true for the consumers of free TV. On aggregate, the consumers benefit more from a lower subscription fee and a lower free TV advertising level than they suffer from additional pay TV advertising. Moreover, if the marginal return from advertising exceeds the viewers' disutility from advertising then introducing advertising in pay TV increases profits of this channel. Regarding the free TV profits, we find that placing advertising in pay TV has a positive effect on the free TV broadcaster's profit if the viewers' disutility from advertising is sufficiently strong. In this case, the positive viewer demand and cost effect overcompensate for the negative revenue effect through a lower advertising level.
Because the model in this paper is a stylized one, we have made some simplifying assumptions. For example, viewers are supposed to join either pay TV or free TV. It is reasonable that free TV viewers without paying the subscription fee are excluded from the pay TV programming such that they are "forced" to single-home. By contrast, pay TV viewers still have the opportunity to watch free TV programming and thus they have the possibility to multi-home.
20 However, the single-homing assumption of viewers is widely adopted in the existing literature when it comes to capture the competition for viewer market share between media firms. 21 One can justify the assumption by pointing out that viewers cannot physically watch two broadcasts at the same time (at least without decreasing the entertainment value) and thus have to make a choice for watching only one channel. Furthermore, we have assumed that the broadcaster's marginal return on advertising and the viewers' disutility parameter is symmetric between channels. An interesting avenue for further research would be to allow for heterogeneity in the effectiveness of advertising and the disutility parameter, respectively. Moreover, it would be interesting to extend our framework and to explicitly model the advertiser's market. This extension would allow deriving social welfare that includes the advertiser's surplus. In our model, social welfare comprises only aggregate broadcasting profit and viewer surplus. Finally, further research regarding the viewers' disutility from advertising is needed.
22 For example, it would be potentially fruitful to empirically assess the value of the disutility parameter.
22 As also suggested by Peitz and Valletti (2008) . Moreover, a p is the pay TV advertising level if free TV refrains from advertising, i.e., a p = R p (0). Now, we have to show that a p > a p . This guarantees that the monotonous reaction function have exactly one intersection point, which characterizes the unique equilibrium. Because c (a * f ) = ((k −γ)a p +t). With the implicit function theorem, we derive
for t sufficiently large. Because a p (t) is continuous and a monotonously increasing function in t and a p (t) is continuous and a monotonously decreasing function in t, there exists a value t eq such that a p (t) > a p (t) for all t > t eq . Hence, we have shown that for a sufficiently large differentiation parameter t eq , an unique equilibrium (a * p , a * f ) exists. Hence, the equilibrium subscription fee s * p also exists and is unique. For example, for a quadratic cost function c(a) = 1/2a 2 , the advertising level a p (t) is
